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impatience and risk aversion
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About one third of all Chileans take early retirement. As retirement 
age approaches, people become more aware of the health issues 
associated with that stage of life. This reduces their uncertainty about their 
future quality of life and may lead to a relative increase in impatience. This 
article offers a theoretical examination of how future life expectancy affects 
relative levels of impatience in ways that may increase the probability of 
early retirement. The empirical findings for Chile show that the greater 
people’s future life expectancy is, the less likely they will be to take early 
retirement. The article also looks at how risk aversion increases relative 
impatience as a consequence of people’s uncertainty as to whether or 
not they will enjoy a good quality of life in the years ahead. The empirical 
findings point to a positive correlation between risk aversion and early 
retirement via the mechanism of life expectancy.
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Although the current tendency in pension policy is to 
raise the retirement age, early retirement is fairly common 
in Chile. Of all those who retired in 2006, 35% did so 
early.1 According to data from the country’s pension 
fund management companies (afps), people who opt 
to start drawing their pensions early are doing so at 
age 55, on average. From a public policy standpoint, 
the reasons behind these retirement decisions therefore 
merit examination. This article offers a new perspective 
on the important role which impatience and risk aversion 
may play in early retirement decisions.
People who retire early receive smaller pensions 
than they would if they retired at the age established 
by law, and they have to use those pensions to cover 
their living expenses over a greater number of years, on 
average (Nalebuff and Zeckhauser, 1985). Given that the 
number of pensioners is rising every year and that 35% 
are retiring early, it is important to understand how risk 
aversion influences the decision to retire early.2 
In Chile, in order to take early retirement,3 a person 
must have belonged to the new pension system for at 
least five years and must have accumulated pension funds 
equal to or greater than 62%4 of the taxable income 
declared over the past 10 years. Requirements such as 
these may have little impact on the impatience factor 
at the individual level, however.
A person who has reached an age at which he or 
she must decide whether to retire early or to wait until 
the legally mandated age is more aware of the loss of 
  The authors are grateful for valuable comments received from José 
Luis Ruiz and the participants in the Meeting of the Economics Society 
of Chile and the Microdata Centre. Professor Ruiz-Tagle wishes to 
express his gratitude for the funding provided to the Microdata Centre 
under the Millennium Science Initiative within the framework of 
project P07S-023-F.
1  Pensions Oversight Agency, Chile.
2  According to the results of the Social Protection Survey (eps), 
the percentage of pensioners rose from 13.3% in 2004 to 14.5% in 
2006.
3  Act No. 19.943.
4  Under Act No. 19.943, this percentage was raised to 70% on 19 
August 2010. 
cognitive and motor abilities that can occur as people 
grow older. Accordingly, the value placed on the years 
that they have left to live (future life expectancy) can 
generate differences in relative levels of impatience. 
Uncertainty about the quality of life that they may enjoy 
in the future can lead risk-averse individuals to prioritize 
present consumption over future consumption. This article 
offers evidence that the higher an individual’s level of 
risk aversion is, the greater that person’s relative level 
of impatience will be.
In this analysis, a person’s decision as to when to 
retire is represented by an aggregate utility model over 
two periods, such that a social-security contributor who 
retires at the beginning of the first period is doing so 
early, whereas one who retires at the start of the second 
period is doing so at the legally established age. Thus, 
the legally mandated age defines the break between 
the two periods. The estimation procedure used here 
involves a discrete choice model which distinguishes 
only between whether or not the individual takes early 
retirement. This procedure follows the structure suggested 
by the theoretical model, with the aim being to identify 
the impact that the perception of future quality of life, 
based on future life expectancy (Bleichrodt and Quiggin, 
1999), has in terms of the level of impatience that leads 
people to retire early. 
The results show that those who retire early are 
using a higher intertemporal discount rate, which could 
be attributable to their perceived future life expectancy. 
Some evidence is also found that the higher the level 
of risk aversion, the greater the degree of impatience 
to take early retirement, which may reflect uncertainty 
about future quality of life.
The rest of this article is structured as follows: after 
this introduction, section II offers a brief review of the 
regulatory context and the existing data and literature. 
Section III sets forth the theoretical framework and the 
estimation model used. Section IV presents the empirical 
analysis, description of variables and empirical findings, 
as well as some possible extensions of the model and 
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Prior to 1980, Chile had a pay-as-you-go pension system. 
At that point, however, it consolidated its structural 
pension-system reform programme.5 This reform allowed 
it to phase out the pay-as-you-go system and to replace it 
with a fully funded system based on individual accounts. 
Unlike its predecessor, this financing mechanism relies 
on market returns.
Part of the literature on pensions focuses on 
examining the factors that may lead people to start 
drawing their pensions before the legally mandated 
age. Some authors have posited that the likelihood that 
people will decide to take early retirement increases as 
their social security benefits rise (Mitchell and Phillips, 
2000), as their level of additional savings increases (Au, 
Mitchell and Phillips, 2005) and as their perception of 
their own health status diminishes (Hammitt, Haninger 
and Treich, 2005). Some studies use simulations to work 
out the reasons for this kind of retirement decision. For 
example, Poterba, Rauh and Venti (2005) maintain that 
the future marginal utility could be quite high even for a 
low-risk household if its members succeed in diversifying 
their investments in such a way as to permit them to take 
early retirement. Taking a different approach, Diamond 
and Köszegi (2003) propose a quasi-hyperbolic model as 
a basis for arguing that a lack of self-control influences 
retirement behaviour and, in particular, the decision to 
retire early.
5  Decree-Law No. 3500.
Early retirement decisions may also be influenced 
by the business cycle. For example, a period of high 
unemployment may further diminish the chances that 
people nearing retirement age have of finding a job and 
thereby prompt them to retire early (Hairault, Langot 
and Sopraseuth, 2010). Another possibility is that a 
recessionary phase of the business cycle may depress 
wages to such an extent that it increases the likelihood of 
early retirement in the presence of an endogenous labour 
supply (Chai and others, 2009). On the other hand, a 
downswing in the business cycle may drive down the 
rates of return at which future pension payments can be 
calculated, thereby making the prospect of drawing on 
retirement pensions ahead of time less attractive and thus 
encouraging people to delay their retirement.
People’s perception of their health and future life 
expectancy are very closely related. French (2005) 
finds evidence that people’s state of health, or their 
uncertainty as to the likelihood that they will remain 
healthy in the future, influences their decision about 
when to retire. Guiso and Paiella (2006) find that the 
level of risk aversion provides a basis for predicting a 
series of household decisions, including the decision to 
take early retirement. Risk tolerance is also positively 
correlated with people’s perception of their own state of 
health and future life expectancy (Hammitt, Haninger 
and Treich, 2005). This study will therefore seek to 
arrive at a formal expression of the integration of risk 
aversion into early retirement decisions, together with 
people’s perceptions of their state of health and life 
expectancy, based on their assessment of their future 
quality of life.
II
review of the literature on pensions
III
Theoretical model and empirical strategy
A model that provides a formal expression of the 
influence that impatience and risk aversion exert on 
early retirement decisions is presented below. This 
represents an analytical formalization of the decision 
to retire early or to wait until the legally mandated 
age based on a simple two-stage life-cycle model. In 
this model, then, if a person takes early retirement, he 
or she does so during the first of these time periods; 
if not, then the person retires during the second 
time period. 
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Let us take U(∙) to represent the aggregate utility 
under conditions of linear separability, while u(∙)6 
will represent the utility in a given period, such that 
u'(Ct) > 0 and u''(Ct) < 0. It is also assumed that the 
utility function for each period is isoelastic (constant 
relative risk aversion, or crra), such that σ represents 
the crra, ρ is the intertemporal discount rate, which will 
be written as the discount factor β(H,σ) and is linked to 
risk aversion σ and life expectancy H.
The maximization of individual welfare consists of:
 
max ( , , , , )
( , ) ( , )














Subject to:  C At t t+ ≤ λY B+ ⋅
C r A s B A(1 ) (1 )(1t t t1 λ≤ + ⋅ + + −+ ) 0⋅ ≥
where r represents the market interest rate and s represents 
the rate of return offered by afps. B corresponds to the 
amount of pension funds that a person has accumulated, 
while λ is the portion that a person receives when he 
or she retires, which may vary depending on how early 
an age the person retires at. If a person waits until the 
legally mandated age, λ will be zero (0). Finally, At 
represents the initial level of assets.
In order to incorporate the value placed on life 
expectancy and risk aversion into the measurement of 
relative impatience, the discount factor is defined as 
β(H,σ) = δ.Ø(H,σ). The parameter δ is a constant that 
represents the distortion in the discount factor generated 
by the difference between the values that different 
individuals place on their quality of life. In the case 
of the function Ø(H,σ), it is assumed that, for a given 
level of risk aversion lim ( , )H H→ =0 0φ σ , which means 
that if a person does not expect to live much longer, 
his or her only chance to have a better quality of life is 
in the present. In addition, it is assumed that 
lim ( , )H H→∞ =φ σ 1, which indicates that future quality 
of life does not compete with present quality of life.
Proposition 1. The function Ø(H,σ) is defined as increasing 
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In view of how tight the credit market is at present, 
it is assumed that individuals in this economy are faced 
with liquidity constraints.
6  It is assumed that the function satisfies the Inada conditions 
lim ( )C u C→∞ ′ = 0 and lim ( )C u C→ ′ = ∞0 .
Some of the factors mentioned in the literature 
that could account for a decline in future marginal 
utility are the non-contributory element in the social 
security system, financial risks and a person’s state of 
health. Social security and the financial market are not 
under any one person’s control. Nonetheless, a person’s 
perception of his or her state of health is used as a basis 
for calculating future life expectancy. In fact, Engen, 
Gale and Uccello (1999) show that a failure to take 
this element into account places serious limitations on 
estimates for temporal consumption models. Alternatively, 
it may be that this condition is attributable to different 
people’s psychological make-up as reflected in their 
attitude about the years to come.
In the proposed model, Ø(H,σ) represents the future 
value that an individual places on his or her future life 
expectancy, which is similar to the concept of longevity 
as a probability of living for a given period of time 
as described in Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999), or to 
the incorporation of a person’s state of health into the 
intertemporal discount factor as described by Nordhaus 
(2002). The idea is to establish the future discount rate 
that people will use based on their assessment of their 
future psychological and physical state.
The constraints expressed in the model for equation 
(1) can be summed up as:
C C Y B Bt r t t
s r
r









For the sake of simplicity, we will call this R = 1+r. 
It is assumed that people will use up all of their assets by 
the time that they die. On the other hand, if s < r, then 
everyone —regardless of their degree of risk aversion or 
impatience— will take early retirement, since the model 
will be offering them a better financial option, no matter 
what they decide to do with their assets after retirement. 
Thus, the decision to take early retirement is relevant only 
if the rate of return on the person’s individual account 
is higher or equal to the market rate.7 
The condition for equilibrium in the problem shown 
in equation (1) thus comes down to:
7 Business cycles have an impact on both the rate of return for an 
individual’s account and the market rate of return, mainly via a 
levelling effect which may also alter rate differentials. Nonetheless, 
downswings in the business cycle that lead to a drop in the rates of 
return used to calculate future pensions may discourage people from 
retiring either at the legally mandated age or earlier. This presupposes 
that they expect rates of return to increase in the short term, however, 
and does not affect people’s propensity to retire based on the difference 
between market rates and the rates for individual accounts.
107
CHILE: EARLy REtIREMEnt, IMPAtIEnCE AnD RIsk AVERsIon  •  jAIME RuIz-tAgLE AnD PABLo tAPIA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 1



















( , ) (1
σ














( , ) ( , )
σ
δ φ 1σ σ
 
At the same time, the ratio between future and 
present consumption must be lower for people who 
decide to take early retirement, A, than it is for those 
who decide to wait until the legally mandated age, L. 
This occurs because the former are substituting a higher 
level of present consumption for a lower level of future 
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Thus, if the utility function is isoelastic,8 as 
in u C Ct t( ,
σ−1 1σ σ= −( )) / , and consumption levels 
are greater than unity and the risk-aversion index is 
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However, equation (2) should hold both for people 
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Thus < < <φ σA
A A
L
L L( , ) ( , )0 1H Hφ σ , which 
indicates that people who take early retirement are 
more impatient and so tend to discount future revenues 
more heavily. This difference in discounting may occur 
because of: (i) a difference in the value ascribed to the 
remaining years of life expectancy;9 (ii) differences in 
life expectancy; or (iii) a difference in the level of risk 
aversion.
8  Constant Relative Risk Aversion (crra).
9  This difference is probably due to the fact that persons who retire 
early would presumably enjoy the first years of their remaining years 
of life more than the people who wait until the legally mandated 
age would.
If equally risk-averse individuals (σA = σL = σ) have 
the same perceived life expectancy (HA = HL = H), then, 
if some of them decide to take early retirement, it follows 
that they value their remaining years of life differently 
(ØA(H,σ) < ØL(H,σ)). Since life expectancy equates 
to a person’s remaining years of life, then the idea of 
enjoying a better quality of life in the present than in 
the future is equivalent to a lower future valuation of 
life expectancy (a lower discount factor). On the other 
hand, a person might be setting an equal value on the 
years that remain to him or her (Ø(HA,σ) = Ø(HL,σ)), in 
which case, if the person wishes to take early retirement, 
then that person must believe that he or she has fewer 
years left to live (HA < HL).
If we assume that two people have the same future life 
expectancy (HA = HL = H) and risk-aversion coefficients 
of σ0 and σ1, respectively, then they will be risk averse 
if σ0 > 1 and σ1 > 1. However, if σ0 < σ1, then the first 
person will be less risk-averse tan the second. Thus, 






























j A  (6)
This new condition is shown in equation (7), where 
(b) and (c) represent the equilibrium condition set up in 
(5), while (a) represents the equilibrium condition for an 
individual who decides to take early retirement but who 
is more risk averse than the level defined in (b). 
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In order for equation (7) to hold, it is necessary that:
φ σA A
A( , ) (H Hφ σA0 , )< <1 0
L ( , )
LHφ σ< <10
Thus, if a person retires early, it is because he or she 
discounts the future more heavily. The smaller discount 
factor is due to the difference in the present value placed 
on future life expectancy. This difference is heightened 
by a greater degree of risk aversion owing to the level 
of uncertainty as to whether the person will have a good 
quality of life in the future. 
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While the theoretical model tells us something about 
the expected behaviour of people when the time comes 
to decide when to retire, taking into account their 
future life expectancy and degree of risk aversion, the 
hypotheses derived from that model are not directly 
measureable by econometric means. The following 
empirical strategy is designed to provide a simple, 
estimable way of incorporating the characteristics of 
the theoretical model.
The decision as to whether to retire early or at the 
legally mandated age can be presented as a discrete 
choice, with a rational individual opting for the alternative 
that will provide a greater level of utility. It is generally 
agreed that indirect utility should be taken into account 
in analysing discrete choices, since this internalizes the 
constraints associated with income and other restrictions 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Hensher, Barnard and 
Truong, 1988).
Using an empirical approach, we take the dichotomous 
variable Y, which represents the retirement decision 
and is equal to 1 if the person decides to take early 
retirement. This will be the case if the latent, indirect 
utility of retiring early, U *A, is greater than it would be 
if the person waits until the legally mandated age, U *L. 
Otherwise, the retirement decision variable will be zero 




















Equation (8) shows the conditions under which a 
person decides to take early retirement or to wait until 
the legally mandated age, bearing in mind that one of the 
parameters for the utility function is risk aversion.
Taking the utility function defined in equation (1), 
we introduce a latent variable to represent the indirect 
utility function for individual i and decision j: 
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σ i
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 (9)
where the intertemporal discount rate is represented 
by β σ δ φ σ( , = ⋅H H , )) ( , as explained in detail in 
section III.
It is assumed that both groups have the same 
future life expectancy. Using that as a basis, an ad hoc 
assumption is made concerning the valuation of life 
expectancy, such that:
 
φ σ φ σ
σ











1 j A L aj, ; 0
= =a H j i
= >
 (10)
It will also be assumed that the members of both 
groups believe that they will live the same number of 
years, and the difference in their discount factors will 
therefore stem from the difference in their valuations 
of their remaining years of life, as represented by the 
parameter aj in equation (10).
The function described in equation (10) fulfils 
Proposition No. 1, such that, at a constant level of 
risk aversion, people will behave as shown in figure 1. 
Parameter aj stands for the value that they place on the 
years remaining to them, which could be interpreted as 
the value ascribed to their future quality of life; thus: 
aA < aL.
If the same assessment of future life expectancy 
H is maintained but the level of risk aversion changes 
from σ0 to a less risk-averse σ1, i.e., σ0 < σ1, then a 
higher value is placed on future years of life. This is 
shown in figure 2.
Now, if (10) is substituted for (9), a broader 
expression of indirect utility is obtained.
 




























Component (I) gives the classic discount model 
for two periods of time. Component (II) is an additional 
term for the “loss” of utility of future consumption 
due to the assessment of the present vis-à-vis future 
life expectancy.
IV
An empirical strategy for identifying the 
determinants of early retirement
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FIGURE 1
relationship between valuation of future life expectancy and degree of impatience 
Source: Original calculations.
FIGURE 2
Lower valuation of future life expectancy due to uncertain future
Source: Original calculations.
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In order to make the model subject to estimation 
and since components (I) and (II) of equation (11) 
are additionally separated, approximations for each 
component are defined:
 
U Xij ij ij
III









∀ = =i n j A L1
h h⋅ ⋅
 (12)
Thus, the term (III) represents the traditional linear 
approach to the two-period temporal consumption model 
described in (I). This corresponds to the set of attributes 
that define individual preferences, as represented by 
the vector X. It also sets up a structural framework for 
the utility function. This frame of reference makes it 
possible to control for other individual preferences 
(embodied in vector X) that can influence the utility 
function and, accordingly, the decision to retire based on 
a linear function as approached from a semi-restricted 
perspective.
Component (II) of equation (11) was proxied using 
component (IV) of equation (12), with the aim being to 
capture part of its non-linearity. Thus, hi = ln(Hi) and 
parameter αij represent the decrease in future utility 
generated by the increased discount rate involved in 
placing a greater value on the initial years of life that 
are left, with this term being affected by both the scope 
and the sign of changes in aj. This should be negative 
and greater in absolute terms than it is for people who 
decided to retire early. What is more, the parameter λij 
represents the value placed on life expectancy vis-à-vis 
future risk, since the persons involved are risk averse. 
Combining future life expectancy and risk aversion is a 
helpful way to show how increased risk aversion bolsters 
decisions to take early retirement. This is because the 
aversion focuses on the risk of not being able to have 
a good quality of life in the future, while avoiding the 
influence of other types of risk, such as financial risk. 
The decision to take early retirement is therefore a 
probability that can be expressed as follows:
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Lγ γ= − , Ωi i
A
i
Lα α= −  and Λi i
A
i
Lλ λ= − . 
In this binary specification for the model, the working 
hypothesis stands out clearly. First of all, since people 
taking early retirement have to have been more impatient 
than those who waited until the legally mandated age 
(assuming that all other factors remain constant), then 
Ωi < 0. By the same token, the effect of risk aversion 
on the variability of utility is reflected in the hypothesis 
in which Λi > 0; this shows (everything else remaining 
constant) that the greater the degree of risk aversion, the 
greater the propensity to take early retirement will be.
1. Early retirement in Chile
In Chile, not everyone can take early retirement. Early 
retirement is a possibility only for those whose work is 
classified as heavy labour10 and those who have been 
registered in the current (new) pension system for at 
least five years. 
Since 1993, members of the social security system 
have had the option of retiring before the legally 
mandated retirement age,11 provided that they have built 
up enough capital in their individual retirement account 
to provide them with a monthly pension equivalent to 
over 110% of the current minimum wage.12 In 2008, the 
pension system reform entered into effect.13 This reform 
introduced a “solidarity pillar” to provide coverage to 
all Chileans who do not have pension-system savings. 
It is also designed to improve the individual funded 
accounts system, as well as to provide incentives for 
voluntary payments into the system so that people will 
have larger pensions in the future. 
However, people with individual funded pension 
accounts can now take early retirement if the size of 
their pension will be equal to or greater than 70%14 
of their average declared earnings and revenues over 
the 10-year period ending in the month in which they 
would retire. It must also be equal to or greater than 
150% of the current level of the basic solidarity old-age 
pension (pbsv).
When they retire, members of the pension system 
must also decide whether to opt for a programmed pension 
schedule, a life annuity or a mixture of the two. People 
who switched from one pension system to the other and 
still have their pension recognition bonds may be more 
10  National Ergonomics Commission (cen).
11  Article 64 of Act No. 100.
12  These percentages were modified by Act No. 19.943, which entered 
into force in August 2004.
13  Decree-Law No. 20.255
14  This percentage has applied since August 2010. For the period from 
August 2006 to August 2007, it was 58%. For further details, see the 
Pension Superintendency of Chile at: http://safp.cl.
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inclined to wait until the legally mandated retirement 
age, which is when these bonds reach their full value. 
On the other hand, people who have a voluntary 
pension account (apv) may be more inclined to take 
early retirement, since this will increase their chances 
of meeting future requirements. 
Because greater restrictions on early retirement15 are 
being phased in, people may also be more likely to retire 
early, since, if they wait until the following year, they 
may no longer meet the requirements for doing so.
The only available source of information for a detailed 
analysis of the empirical evidence for Chile concerning 
retirees and those eligible for early retirement is the Social 
Protection Survey (eps). The 2006 version of this survey 
covers people aged 18 and over (a total population of 
12,426,437 – 50.9% of whom are women and 49.1% of 
whom are men). At the time of the survey, 12.6% of this 
population reported that they were unemployed, 57% 
said that they were working, and the remaining 30.4% 
were classified as economically inactive.16
15  Act No. 19.943.
16  The way the question about occupational status is phrased in the 
eps differs from the wording used in employment surveys taken by the 
National Statistics Institute (ine) or the occupational survey administered 
by the University of Chile. In the eps, respondents classify their own 
occupational status, whereas in the other employment surveys, it is 
the poll-taker who does so. Because of this difference, in the eps a 
large number of individuals self-report themselves as unemployed, 
whereas many of those same people would have been classified as 
The results of the 2006 eps indicate that average 
monetary income begins to decline at age 50, as shown 
in figure 3. This decline begins at just around the time 
that people begin to decide to take early retirement. 
The number of people deciding to take early 
retirement has fluctuated over time (see figure 4), and 
there seems to be some correlation between this number 
and the rate of return on pension funds. When that rate 
is lower, fewer people would appear to choose to retire 
early, although this effect is lagged somewhat. The 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis is clearly reflected 
in the rate of return on pension funds and in the level 
of early retirements, which did not rebound to their 
pre-crisis levels until 2010.
The figures compiled by the National Statistics 
Institute (ine) indicate that the potential number of 
retirees is rising sharply and could reach about 20% of 
the population by 2016.
In 2006, 9.2% of respondents “self-reported” 
themselves to have retired for a given reason, and slightly 
over one fifth of those people (20.7%) said that they had 
done so because of a disability. For this latter group, the 
decision to retire is exogenous, and they are therefore not 
taken into consideration in the following analysis.
economically inactive by the poll-takers of the other employment 
surveys. This leads to an overestimation of the unemployment rate and 
of the labour participation rate, especially in the case of women.
FIGURE 3
Mean monetary income, by age
(Thousands of pesos)
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When the reason for retiring is cross-referenced with 
the self-reported date of retirement, certain differences 
appear. Table 1 shows that slightly fewer than half of 
the people who said that they had started to draw their 
old-age pensions did so before the legally mandated 
age. When the reason for retirement is corrected for the 
self-reported rate of retirement at the legally mandated 
age, then the percentage of all pensioners who took early 
retirement falls to 35.1%. 
In Chile, 94% of the population belongs to the 
afp system, but only 46% of all retirees do so, with the 
rest being part of the former Pension Standardization 
Institute (inp) scheme or some other system.17 
The 2006 eps included a series of questions designed 
to determine how risk averse the respondents were.18 
This information can be used to classify respondents 
as belonging to one of four risk-aversion categories, 
ranging from a low-level of risk aversion (category 1) 
to a high level (category 4).19 This risk-aversion variable 
17  Fewer than 3% of respondents did not report their reason for 
retiring and even fewer said that they had a voluntary pension savings 
(apv) account.
18  These questions are found in module J (from j1_1 to j1_3).
19  The questions in this module are discrete, and the queries do not 
suffice to cover risk-neutral or risk-seeking individuals.
is determined after asking respondents the following 
question: “Suppose that you, as the only breadwinner 
for your household, had to choose one of the following 
jobs…”, with the first job being described as guaranteeing 
a fixed, stable level of income for life and the second 
as offering an equal chance of earning double that level 
for life or only one-fourth as much, half as much or 
three-fourths as much. 
This method for determining the level of risk aversion 
is identical to the one used in the Health and Retirement 
Study (hrs) in the United States and in the Survey on 
Household Income and Wealth (shiw) conducted by the 
Italian central bank. Like the hrs and shiw, the eps sets 
up a situation of convergence towards risk neutrality, 
since each question is stochastically dominated by the 
preceding one; this means that, if an individual prefers the 
option with the lowest expected value, then that individual 
will also prefer the options offering the highest expected 
value. This generates a conditional order of selection. 
The percentage distribution of the differing degrees of 
risk aversion found among the population aged 18 and 
over in the 2006 eps is shown in table 2.
The risk-aversion distribution is somewhat different 
for retirees than it is for non-retirees. As shown in table 3, 
the greatest difference is seen at high risk-aversion levels, 
which is also where the greatest concentration is found. 
FIGURE 4 
retirees, by quarter, with mean afp rate of return, 2004-2010 
Source: Original calculations based on figures from the Pension Superintendency of Chile.
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This might be accounted for by the censure of higher 
levels of risk aversion. 
If, however, early retirees are compared with those 
who retired at the legally mandated age according to 
their self-reported retirement date, then these differences 
disappear (see table 3). This would seem to indicate that 
the decision to take early retirement or not is independent 
of a person’s degree of risk aversion. 
On the other hand, a person’s state of health does 
appear to play an important role in retirement decisions. 
TABLE 1
Type of pension reported by respondents
Self-reported date of 
retirement






Mandated age or higher 56.5 3.7 8.7 35.1
Before mandated age 43.5 96.3 91.3 64.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey 
of 2006.
Population: 1,129.325; No. of observations: 2,375 (total respondents).
TABLE 2
Levels of aversion: retirees and non-retirees
Level of aversion Retired
Population
Persons over 18 No (%) Yes (%)
1 (Low) 20.3 14.0 19.8
2 (Lower-intermediate) 8.6 8.5 8.6
3 (Upper-intermediate) 6.7 4.5 6.5
4 (High) 64.4 73.0 65.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey 
of 2006.
Population: 11,492,732. No. of observations: 15,052 (total respondents).
TABLE 3
Level of risk aversion, by retirement status 
(early or legally mandated)




No (%) Yes (%)
1 (Low) 15.0 13.2 13.9
2 (Lower-intermediate) 8.0 8.8 8.5
3 (Upper-intermediate) 5.4 4.2 4.6
4 (High) 71.6 73.8 73.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey 
of 2006.
No. of observations: 1,875 (total respondents).
a Self-reported date.
According to the results of the 2006 eps, health problems 
were the most main reason for retiring for 21.5% of 
retirees (see table A.3 in annex A), while 24.3% said 
that they retired because they had reached the legally 
mandated age. In addition, in almost 60% of all cases, 
the main reason cited for not continuing to work was 
that the respondents’ state of health prevented them 
from doing so. 
This shows us that people’s perception of their state 
of health is an important consideration in the decision 
to retire. This perception is closely correlated with life 
expectancy, however, since the better a person’s perceived 
state of health is, the greater that person’s future life 
expectancy is, as shown in table 4.
Another important consideration in people’s decisions 
concerning retirement is future life expectancy, which, 
of course, declines with age. Figure 5 shows the rate at 
which mean life expectancy, measured as the estimated 
number of years that a person has left to live, declines 
as a person ages, with the profile being very similar for 
men and women.
More specifically, our focus will be on the future life 
expectancy of people who retire at the legally mandated 
age and of people who retire early. Figure 6 shows that 
the trends for these two groups are similar and that, in 
turn, the trend for these two groups, taken together, is 
similar to the trend for the rest of the population.
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TABLE 4
Mean life expectancy, in years, by perceived state of health
Perceived state of health
Life expectancy (years)
Population Women (51,3%) Men (48,7%)
Percentage Mean Percentage Mean Percentage Mean
Very poor 1.0 12.05 1.5 11.53 0.5 13.69
Poor 5.8 18.25 7.3 17.80 4.2 19.09
Average 22.4 26.42 25.0 26.35 19.5 26.50
Good 48.8 38.68 47.7 38.03 50.1 39.33
Very good 13.3 44.13 12.1 43.53 14.6 44.66
Excellent 8.7 45.92 6.4 44.48 11.1 46.78
100.0 35.8 100.0 34.3 100.0 37.5
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey of 2006.
Population: 9,953,561; No. of observations: 13,086 (total respondents).
FIGURE 5
Mean life expectancy, by age of respondent and sex
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey of 2006.
FIGURE 6 
Mean future life expectancy for men, by age of respondent and retirement status 
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and low level of risk aversion (27% of the sample) (see 
table 3). 
The information that can be used to predict the degree 
of uncertainty surrounding a given event will influence 
what action a risk-averse person will take. The extent 
of a person’s knowledge about the financial market and 
pensions schemes was therefore taken into account.
Information on the geographical area in which 
respondents reside was also included, with the categories 
being northern zones (regions I-IV), central areas 
(regions V-VII) and southern areas (regions VIII-XII). 
The responses from these zones were then compared 
with those given in the Metropolitan Region. 
The descriptive statistic for the variables to be used 
for the estimates is shown in table 6. When the average 
age of respondents and their expectation regarding 
future years of life are examined, it turns out that both 
the group of people who retired at the legally mandated 
age and the group of early retirees believe that they will 
live until nearly 80 years of age. 
The descriptive statistic also indicates that a majority 
of early retirees are men (see table 6). The early retirees 
have lower monetary incomes, which could have to do 
with the fact that the percentage of the members of this 
group who are economically active is also lower, as is 
their lower average level of education.
The retirees in the sample belong to the afp pension 
scheme. Their level of knowledge concerning the afp 
system and the relevant pension plan is slightly lower than 
is the case for those who choose to retire at the legally 
mandated age. The level of knowledge concerning the 
financial market is similar in the two groups of retirees, 
however (see table 6).
2. Estimating the determinants of early 
retirement
Before examining these estimates, we should first 
review the features of the sample and the variables 
to be used. The sample is pared down on the basis of 
a series of considerations that need to be taken into 
account in order to arrive at these estimates. First of all, 
the requirements that must be met under Chilean law 
in order to be eligible for early retirement,20 the way in 
which this situation works out in practice, and the fact 
that respondents have in fact answered the questionnaire 
are all factors that restrict the number of observations.21 
In addition, age ranges of 60-65 for women and 65-70 
for men were set.
The variables that were used have to do with the 
determinants of the utility function. In this case, a vector 
is defined of variables representing traits of individuals, 
households and the labour market, along with those 
having to do with the pension system as such. This set 
of variables is shown in table 5. 
Risk aversion is an intrinsic trait of each individual, 
and it was therefore defined as a parameter whose 
influence on early retirement decisions needed to be 
established. Because the risk-aversion variable exhibits 
little continuity, it had to be grouped into two categories: 
a high level of risk aversion (approximately 73% of the 
sample) and an upper-intermediate, lower-intermediate 
20  Act No. 19.943.
21  The 2006 eps covered 12,426,437 individuals based on 16,443 
respondents, of whom 8.5% did not respond to the question regarding 
risk aversion.
TABLE 5
variables to be taken into consideration
Individual characteristics Household characteristics Other
Gender Head of household Knowledge about afp system
Age Marital status Knowledge about pension system
Years of schooling Number of children Knowledge about financial market
Perceived state of health Number of grandchildren Region of residence, by zone
Perceived life expectancy Monetary income Years in labour market
Level of risk aversion Assets Age at entry into labour market
 Home ownership Economically active
Source: Original calculations.
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TABLE 6
Characteristics of retirees at mandated age and early retirees in sample
(Percentages)














Gender (male = 1) 0.40 0.73   
Years of schooling 7.1 8.1 7.9 10.9 6.0 7.1
Age (years) 65.3 66.1 63.4 62.4 68.1 67.4
Perceived state of health (poor = 1 to excellent = 6) 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.4
Perceived life expectancy (years) 14.7 12.4 16.5 14.9 11.9 11.5
Level of aversion (high = 1) 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
Head of household (yes = 1) 0.72 0.91 0.56 0.80 0.95 0.95
Marital status (partner present = 1) 0.48 0.64 0.43 0.18 0.54 0.81
Number of children 0.22 0.36 0.32 0.42 0.08 0.34
Number of grandchildren 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.6 2.3 2.4
Monetary income (M$ / 2006) $ 287 $ 270 $ 333 $ 238 $ 217 $ 282
Assets (MM$ / 2006) $ 19.85 $ 25.05 $ 21.88 $ 20.02 $ 16.75 $ 26.90
Debts (MM$ / 2006) $ 0.54 $ 0.86 $ 0.84 $ 1.87 $ 0.08 $ 0.49
Home ownership (yes = 1) 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.87 0.91
Knowledge of afp system (<%>) 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.45 0.31 0.38
Knowledge of pension system (<%>) 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.36 0.28 0.42
Knowledge of financial market (yes = 1) 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Northern zone 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.13
Central zone 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.13 0.38 0.19
Southern zone 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.29 0.20
Years in labour market 43.3 39.4 40.1 33.9 48.1 41.5
Age at entry into labour market 19.0 17.4 19.9 21.2 17.5 16.1
Economically active (yes = 1) 0.35 0.43 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.46
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey of 2006.
Men: 65 - 70 years; women: 60 - 65 years.
Note: M$ = Thousands of pesos; MM$ = Millions of pesos.
(a) The estimates
In order to arrive at an estimate for the model 
proposed in equation (13), it will be assumed that the 
errors follow a normal distribution based on a normal 
equivalent deviation (probit). The results, with different 
specifications, are shown in table 7.
The estimates of the marginal effects for the model 
given in table 7 are shown in table 8.
The estimates indicate that the effect of future life 
expectancy on the probability of taking early retirement 
(parameter Ωi) is negative and significant, with a stable 
value for all the models (values of between -0.38 and 
-0.46). The effect of the combined component of life 
expectancy and risk aversion (parameter Λi) is positive, 
but its significance changes if the life expectancy variable 
is not included. This may be because the proxy is 
unsatisfactory or because risk aversion is also affected 
by other factors, such as financial exposure.
Other variables, such as years of schooling 
completed, gender (male) and being economically active, 
increase the utility of early retirement and have a positive 
influence on the probability of taking early retirement 
(see table 7). Similar results are reported by Gustman 
and Steinmeier (2005).22 As people grow older, however, 
they become less likely to take early retirement. This 
finding is corroborated by the estimates arrived at here 
and by other studies (Mitchell and Phillips, 2000).
If people place greater value on their present 
quality of life than on their future quality of life, and if 
this translates into spending more time with their loved 
ones, then having children and being married should 
increase the probability of taking early retirement. 
The estimates corroborate this hypothesis, since the 
variables of marital status (being in a conjugal union) 
and of having children23 are positive and significant, as 
shown in tables 7 and 8. This finding is also reported by 
Mitchell and Phillips (2000). 
22  Their estimates are focused on how the social security system 
and other factors influence retirement decisions, rather than early 
retirement decisions, but their findings also support the estimates 
calculated in this study.
23  When the presence of children (regardless of origin) is the variable 
that is used, the level of significance is greater than when it is restricted 
to children within the household.
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TABLE 7
Probita estimation of life expectancy
Variables
Probability to taking early retirement
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

























































































































































Knowledge of financial market (yes = 1) 0.2242*** 
(0.0186)
Northern zone -0.4605*** 
(0.0155)






Southern zone -0.4322*** 
(0.0125)






























Number of observations 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934
Log Likelihood -72 055.38 -73 440.3 -71 864.87 -68 111.67 -57 350.75 -63 692.79 -58 319.54
Pseudo - R2 0.1668 0.1508 0.169 0.2124 0.3368 0.2635 0.3256
AIC 144 124.8 146 894.6 143 745.7 136 255.3 114 751.5 127 419.6 116 673.1
BIC 144 193.4 146 963.3 143 824.2 136 412.3 114 996.8 127 586.4 116 839.9
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey of 2006.
Note: M$ = Thousands of pesos; MM$ = Millions of pesos; AIC = Akaike Information Criteria; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria.
a Normal equivalent deviation.
Significant at *10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% (standard sample deviation).
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TABLE 8
Estimation of marginal effects in different models
Marginal effects on the likelihood of early retirement
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

























































































































































Knowledge of financial market (yes = 1) 0.0672*** 
(0.0051)
Northern zone -0.1626*** 
(0.0059)






Southern zone -0.15*** 
(0.0047)
















Number of observations 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934 134 934
Log Likelihood -72 055.38 -73 440.3 -71864.87 -68111.67 -57350.75 -63 692.79 -58 319.54
Pseudo - R2 0.1668 0.1508 0.169 0.2124 0.3368 0.2635 0.3256
Obs. P 0.6602 0.6602 0.6602 0.6602 0.6602 0.6602 0.6602
Pred. P 0.6850 0.6814 0.6857 0.6938 0.7438 0.7067 0.7378
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey of 2006.
Note: M$ = Thousands of pesos; MM$ = Millions of pesos; AIC = Akaike Information Criteria; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria. Log 
Likelihood= Logarithm of the probability function; Obs. P= Observed probability; Pred. P= Predicted probability.
Significant at *10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% (standard sample deviation).
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Income, level of assets, indebtedness and home 
ownership are factors that might be taken into account 
when a person decides whether or not to take early 
retirement. This may explain why, when one of these 
variables is removed from the equation, the others change 
sign but not significance. They should therefore be taken 
into consideration (see tables 7 and 8). 
(b) Principal findings
As people age, the value that they place on the 
years of life remaining to them may change, and this 
will be influenced by their individual preferences and 
the quality of life that they expect to have in the years 
to come. Because of the uncertainty surrounding these 
future years of life, their degree of risk aversion will play 
a part in their consumption decisions. What is posited 
in this article, specifically, is that people use different 
intertemporal discount rates depending on how they 
gauge their future life expectancy and their level of risk 
aversion, and that this will influence their decision as 
to whether or not to take early retirement. Our findings 
indicate that people who discount the future more heavily 
because they expect to have fewer years left to live or 
because they are more risk averse, or both, are more 
likely to retire early.
The importance of having quality time to enjoy in 
the present, especially as retirement age looms, is not 
entirely ignored by the pension market either. When people 
express a desire to retire, the counsellors employed by 
the different pension institutions in the market urge them 
to think about the possibility of spending more time with 
their families now and thus make them more aware of 
the possibility of applying a higher future discount rate. 
Accordingly, hard economic times, declining health, 
having a family, and little or no knowledge about the 
pension market could all lead people to take a more 
pessimistic view of the future and thereby place greater 
value on the use of the time that they have now and, 
therefore, to apply a high discount rate or, at the least, 
a high enough one to make them think that it is best to 
take early retirement.
While Guiso and Paiella (2006) find empirical 
evidence that risk aversion helps to explain a series of 
individual decisions, such as entrepreneurship, portfolio 
management, demand for insurance, investment in 
education, migration, job changes and state of health, 
there is no previous evidence of its effect on early 
retirement decisions. The findings of this study show that 
risk aversion alone is not a decisive factor in decisions to 
retire early, but that it is indeed decisive when combined 
with individuals’ perceptions of their futures (see table 7, 
models ii and iii). In addition, the marginal impact that risk 
aversion has on the probability of taking early retirement 
is substantially greater than the effect of age, years of 
schooling, the presence of a partner in the home or the 
number of children (see table 7, models vi and vii). 
V
Conclusions
We have presented evidence that people who retire early 
are applying a higher intertemporal discount rate because 
they place a greater present value on the years that are 
left to them and because of the way that their level of 
risk aversion causes them to react to the uncertainty 
surrounding those additional years of life. While risk 
aversion has been linked to various individual decisions 
in the literature, this is the first study to establish that 
link with the decision to take early retirement.
The average age of the respondents and their 
perceived life expectancy were considered. Both the group 
of persons who had waited until the legally mandated 
age to retire and the group of early retirees believe that 
their mean life expectancy is approximately 80 years. 
The estimation procedures that were used showed that 
being a head of household and having a greater number 
of children have a positive and significant influence on 
the probability of early retirement. This could be due 
to an urgent need for household funds in the present 
that causes the present value of such funds to outweigh 
their future value to such an extent that the possibility 
of a better future pension is foregone. 
Robust evidence was found that the two groups’ 
valuation of the years of life left to them differs, with 
those who place a greater value on their remaining years 
in the present than in the future therefore applying a 
lower intertemporal discount rate and consequently 
moving their retirement date forward. 
Evidence was also found which indicates that the 
higher the level of risk aversion, the greater the degree 
of impatience to take early retirement. This could be due 
to uncertainty as to the possibility of enjoying a better 
120
CHILE: EARLy REtIREMEnt, IMPAtIEnCE AnD RIsk AVERsIon  •  jAIME RuIz-tAgLE AnD PABLo tAPIA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 1
AnnEx A
Supplementary tables
Module J of the 2006 Social Protection Survey (eps) contains three questions (j1_1 - j1_3) that are used to place the respondents 
at one of four different levels of risk aversion, ranging from the lowest (1) to the highest level of aversion (4). 
TABLE A.1





Women Men No Yes No Yes
1 (Low) 2 278 115 964 894 1 313 221 871 829 1 406 286 2 146 101 132 014
2 (Lower-intermediate) 985 508 464 222 521 286 398 050 587 458 905 571 79 937
3 (Upper-intermediate) 750 826 361 057 389 769 327 635 423 191 708 212 42 614
4 (Alto) 7 478 283 3 975 611 3 502 672 3 360 807 4 117 476 6 789 315 688 968
Total 11 492 732 5 765 784 5 726 948 4 958 321 6 534 411 10 549 199 943 533
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey (eps) of 2006.
TABLE A.2
Membership in pension systems
Pension System
Population Retirees
System No. Percentage No.  Percentage
afp 7 550 278 88.5 338 274 41.3
inp 849 219 10.0 421 799 51.5
capredena 25 260 0.3 9 123 1.1
dipreca 26 228 0.3 5 173 0.6
Other 81 157 1.0 44 543 5.4
Total 8 532 142 100.0 818 912 100.0
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey (eps) of 2006. Respondents self-reported their pension system 
membership.
afp: Pension fund management companies.
inp: Pension Standardization Institute.
capredena: National Defence Pension Fund.
dipreca: Carabineros Pension Administration. 
quality of life in the future. It would therefore be more 
beneficial to discount future utility more heavily and 
to prefer to enjoy a better present quality of life. These 
effects overshadow other variables such as age, years 
of schooling and household structure.
This analysis thus offers evidence that supports the 
hypothesis of heterogeneity in intertemporal discount rates 
linked to future life expectancy, which is heightened by 
uncertainty about future quality of life. As an extrapolation 
from these conclusions, it can be posited that situations 
such as economic crises, increased uncertainty as to the 
possibility of enjoying quality time in the future and 
small monetary shocks can increase the probability of 
early retirement as well.
(Original: Spanish)
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TABLE A.3
retirees in the afp system: retirees at the legally mandated age and early retirees
Reasons for retiring
Retired population (Percentages)




To increase income by undertaking new income-generating activities 24.9 8.5 36.0
To use disposable funds or surpluses 4.8 3.1 6.0
Convinced to do so by a sales agent 1.1 0.0 1.8
Health problems 21.5 24.3 19.5
To devote time to other, non-occupational activities 6.0 3.6 7.6
Completed years of service (inp, dipreca or capredena) 8.7 15.4 4.2
The company offered a buy-out 3.8 3.7 3.9
Because was performing heavy labour 0.5 0.0 0.7
Became unemployed and little time remained until retirement age 5.9 0.2 9.3
Received a gift or money from a sales agent 0.0 0.0 0.0
Reached legally mandated retirement age 20.0 40.4 6.2
Other 2.9 0.0 4.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Original calculations based on the Social Protection Survey (eps) of 2006.
inp: Pension Standardization Institute.
capredena: National Defence Pension Fund.
dipreca: Carabineros Pension Administration. 
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